In 2007, the criminal liability of individuals for breaches of competition law was further defined. The amendments made the criminal liability of individuals clearer and provided for more detailed provisions on division of labour and cooperation between the competition authorities and the police in the investigation of offences against competition law.
The criminal liability of individuals for breaches of competition law is limited to offences involving illegal agreements, which are considered the most serious breaches of competition law. The reason for this is that in cases where collusion is suspected, significant interests of consumers and business are at stake, as illegal collusion between companies can result in serious economic harm. Under the current competition law, an individual, i.e. an employee or director of a company, who carries out, encourages or has carried out concerted action, may be subject to fines or imprisonment for up to six years. Specifically, the criminal liability covers collusion on prices, discounts, surcharges or other commercial terms, collusion on the division of markets and the restriction of production, collusion on the making of offers, collusion to refrain from dealing with certain companies or customers, and the provision of information on these specific matters. It also includes collusion between companies that aims to prevent them from competing with each other.
Abuse of a dominant position cannot be penalised in the same way for individuals. The explanatory memorandum to the bill stated:
It is a fact that the abuse of a dominant position, pursuant to Article 11 of the Competition Act, can cause significant damage to society, and there are grounds for arguing that such abuse should be punishable in the same way as illegal collusion. However, it is considered that the application of such a penal provision could be problematic, as it may be necessary to carry out a complex economic analysis to determine whether the company in question holds a dominant position. Furthermore, in exceptional cases, it may be difficult for a company to determine whether it holds a dominant position within the meaning of Article 11 of the Competition Act. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that Article 11 of the Act prohibits conduct that may be normal and even pro-competitive where a company is not in a dominant position. On this basis, there is no reason to impose a penalty for the abuse of a dominant position. The conclusion is consistent with the competition law of most Western countries, which provides for penalties for competition offences, e.g. the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States.
Individuals who commit competition law infringements are only subject to a public investigation following a complaint by the Competition Authority to the police. The Competition Authority assesses on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the gravity of the infringement, whether to refer a case to the police. It is important that the Competition Authority maintains consistency in the handling of comparable cases. It should also be noted that the Competition Authority may decide not to prosecute an individual if he or the company he works for has taken the initiative to provide the Competition Authority with information or evidence concerning infringement of competition law which can lead to the proof of the infringements or is considered a significant contribution to the evidence already in the possession of the Competition Authority.
Samkeppniseftirlitinu er heimilt að afhenda lögregluyfirvöldum gögn og upplýsingar sem aflað hefur verið og tengjast umræddum brotum sem til rannsóknar eru. Á sama hátt getur lögreglan afhent Samkeppniseftirlitinu gögn og upplýsingar sem máli skipta. Þá er Samkeppniseftirlitinu heimilt að taka þátt í aðgerðum lögreglu sem varða rannsóknina og lögreglu er jafnframt heimilt að taka þátt í aðgerðum samkeppnisyfirvalda.
Yes. It is possible to be a party to an illegal agreement even if others handle its implementation, and it is also possible to be a party to an agreement where no one does anything, i.e. an agreement on inaction. The prohibition of unlawful collusion under competition law does not only cover direct actions, but also agreements concerning actions or inactions.
It is best to provide an example in this answer:
Representatives of three companies are sitting in a meeting. Representatives of two companies conspire to establish an illegal cartel involving all three companies. The cartel is planned and launched, without the direct participation of the third representative. Nevertheless, he would be considered a party to the collusion because he was present at the meeting where the collusion was established and planned, and was thus fully aware of it.
To not be considered a party to the consultation, the third representative would have had to make it very clear that they would not be taking part in the consultation. Even by taking their glass of water and spilling it to draw attention to their point.
Article 12 of the Competition Act states that associations of undertakings are prohibited from deciding on restraints of competition or encouraging barriers which are prohibited under the Act. Legislative history states that the provision emphasises that both associations of undertakings and the undertakings themselves are prohibited from establishing or encouraging barriers that contravene the prohibitions in the Act. It is clear from this that an infringement of Article 12 constitutes a standalone infringement of competition law, even though the substantive content of the provision is to some extent set out in other provisions of the competition law, such as Article 10.
A decision of an association of undertakings, within the meaning of competition law, refers to any binding or non-binding decision or recommendation which the association issues to its member undertakings in such a way that it is capable of affecting the commercial conduct of the members. No formal requirements apply to these decisions by associations of undertakings. The use of the term 'incitement' in Article 12 of the Competition Act indicates that the legislature intended to place particular emphasis on the provision covering any non-binding measures by business associations that are aimed at distorting competition. The term 'incitement' in Article 12 of the Competition Act thus covers all actions and measures by business associations intended to encourage member undertakings to behave in a certain way. The wording of the provision implies that such an incitement can be in any form whatsoever. It follows that various actions by business associations, such as guidelines, recommendations or the provision of information, can fall within the scope of Article 12 of the Competition Act if these actions are intended to, or have the effect of, preventing or distorting competition.
It must also be borne in mind that, in the context of business associations, a risk arises of information exchange which may contravene the prohibition in Article 10 of the Competition Act, even if this is not the intention. Article 10 of the Competition Act strictly prohibits all collusion between competitors, as well as concerted practices between them. This means that any collusion between competitors in the market regarding prices, discounts, terms of trade, market sharing, production or other business matters is prohibited. Collusion can include any form of communication between the employees of competitors, whether the communication is one-way or two-way.
Fjárhæð sekta fer eftir eðli og umfangi brots, hversu lengi brotið hefur staðið yfir og hvort um ítrekuð brot er að ræða. Fleiri þættir geta komið til skoðunar, t.d. stærð brotlegs fyrirtækis, huglæg afstaða stjórnenda og hagnaðarsjónarmið. Sektir geta numið allt að 10% af ársveltu brotlegs fyrirtækis. Hafa ber í huga að samtök fyrirtækja eru einnig sektuð fyrir samkeppnislagabrot. Í tilvikum samtaka fer um sektarákvörðun eftir veltu samtakanna sjálfra eða veltu hvers aðila þeirra sem er virkur á þeim markaði sem brot samtakanna tekur til.
There is no requirement that a company must be run for a profit for fines to be imposed for a breach of competition law. However, it is clear that the imposition of fines takes into account each individual case as well as the general objective of deterrence. In the context of competition law, fines should therefore contribute to the enforcement of competition legislation and thereby increase competition. As provided for in competition law, a decision to impose a fine may be waived if the infringement is considered minor or if, for other reasons, a fine is not considered necessary to contribute to and strengthen effective competition.
Það hvort fyrirtæki eru rekin með hagnaði eða ekki hefur eitt og sér ekki úrslitaáhrif þegar kemur að því að meta hvort og hversu mikið sekta eigi brotlegt fyrirtæki. Hér er hægt að lesa nánar um hvernig sektir eru ákvarðaðar.
Reglur um niðurfellingu eða lækkun sekta gilda eingöngu um brot er varða ólögmætt samráð. Fyrirtæki sem er þátttakandi í ólögmætu samráði eða ólögmætum samstilltum aðgerðum getur fengið sektir, sem ella hefðu verið á það lagðar, felldar niður eða lækkaðar. Til þess að eiga möguleika á niðurfellingu sekta í heild þarf fyrirtæki annað hvort að vera fyrst til þess að vekja athygli Samkeppniseftirlitsins á ólögmætu samráði og leggja fram gögn sem leiða til þess að rannsókn Samkeppniseftirlitsins á umræddu samkeppnislagabroti hefjist eða vera fyrst til þess að leggja Samkeppniseftirlitinu að eigin frumkvæði í té gögn sem gera eftirlitinu kleift að sanna slík brot. Fyrirtæki á þess ekki kost að fá sektir niðurfelldar að öllu leyti nema það sýni fullan samstarfsvilja og afhendi öll gögn og upplýsingar sem það býr yfir og varða viðkomandi samkeppnislagabrot. Jafnframt þarf viðkomandi fyrirtæki að hætta þátttöku í brotastarfseminni og má auk þess ekki hafa þvingað önnur fyrirtæki til þátttöku í hinu ólögmæta samráði.
In this context, it is crucial that the company in question is first to the table, that is to say, the first to alert the Competition Authority to the existence of an illegal cartel or the first to provide evidence that enables the Authority to prove such a cartel. Fines will not be fully waived unless the Competition Authority did not previously have sufficient evidence to initiate an investigation or to prove an infringement.
Other than as set out above, a company may have fines reduced if it submits evidence that constitutes a significant addition to the evidence already in the Competition Authority's possession. It is in a company's best interest to be the first to submit evidence that constitutes a significant addition, as the company that does so will receive the largest proportional reduction. If more companies come forward later and submit data to the Competition Authority that qualifies as a significant addition, the proportional reduction they can receive on their fine is lower than that of the company that came before them. The company that comes next receives a smaller reduction than the first one, and so on.
When assessing which data constitutes material evidence, consideration is given to the extent to which the data helps to establish the facts of the case, taking into account the nature and accuracy of the data. Generally, written evidence that originates at the time the wrongdoing occurs is of greater value than evidence that comes into existence later. Furthermore, direct evidence is more significant than circumstantial evidence.
The Competition Authority's rules on the remission and reduction of fines are numbered. 890/2005 and can be accessed here.
Eitt af grundvallaratriðum samkeppnislaganna er bann við verðsamráði fyrirtækja. Ólögmætt verðsamráð er fyrir hendi þegar fyrirtæki gera með sér samning eða þau með samstilltum aðgerðum fylgja sameiginlegri áætlun sem takmarkar eða er líkleg til að takmarka sjálfstæða hegðun þeirra á markaðnum. Í þessu felst því að fyrirtæki eiga að ákveða sjálfstætt, hvert fyrir sig, hvernig þau ætla að hegða sér á markaði. Þessi krafa um sjálfstæði bannar þó ekki að fyrirtæki grípi til aðgerða vegna hegðunar keppinauta sinna á markaðnum. Hún bannar hins vegar hvers konar samskipti milli keppinauta, bein eða óbein, sem hafa eða geta haft þau áhrif á hegðun keppinauta á markaðnum að draga úr samkeppni á milli þeirra eða raska henni. Fyrirtæki gerast t.d. sek um ólögmætt samráð ef þau á fundi, í símtali, í bréfi, í tölvupósti eða með öðrum hætti eiga viðræður eða skiptast á eða taka við upplýsingum um atriði sem hafa þýðingu fyrir ákvörðun um verð. Það eitt að keppinautar á markaði verðleggi vörur sínar með svipuðum eða sama hætti og elti hver annan í verðbreytingum er því ekki eitt og sér nægilegt til að sýna fram á að um ólögmætt verðsamráð sé að ræða.
Accordingly, for there to be an illegal price-fixing, it is a condition that the companies in question have had some form of direct or indirect communication with each other. It may, of course, be difficult in individual cases to distinguish between, on the one hand, concerted practices of undertakings, in which they consciously participate in order to restrict competition, and, on the other hand, situations where undertakings behave in the same or a similar manner on the market as a result of competition. An example of the latter is a duopoly, where companies in, for example, a transparent market are constantly mindful of how their competitors will react to a particular market action, such as a price reduction. However, an examination of the market and market conditions should usually be able to reveal whether coordinated actions are taking place. Under certain circumstances, similar behaviour by competitors in the market can be an indication of illegal collusion.
Hægt er að lesa meira um ólögmætt samráð here.
Í stuttu máli er svarið já, allt samráð
fyrirtækja sem truflar samkeppni er bannað. Það er meginregla í samkeppnisrétti
að fyrirtæki á samkeppnismörkuðum skuli haga sér sjálfstætt um öll þau atriði
sem samkeppni er um. Þar má t.d. nefna ákvarðanir um vöruúrval, þjónustuleiðir
og verð.
Það skiptir ekki máli hvernig samráðið á
sér stað, þ.e. hvort fulltrúar fyrirtækja hittist á fundum, skrifist á,
undirriti formlega samninga eða sammælist um markaðshegðun á einhvern annan
hátt. Engu máli skiptir heldur hvort þessir samningar eða samskipti séu
bindandi eða aðeins leiðbeinandi. Það sem skiptir máli við mat á því hvort um
ólögmætt samráð sé að ræða er hvort markmið eða afleiðingar háttseminnar eru
takmörkun eða röskun á samkeppni.
Samtökum fyrirtækja, stjórnarmönnum slíkra
samtaka, starfsmönnum þeirra og mönnum sem valdir eru til trúnaðarstarfa í þágu
samtakanna er einnig bannað að taka þátt í samráði.
Það er þó viðurkennt í samkeppnisrétti að
samráð milli fyrirtækja sem hafa litla hlutdeild á markaði hafi minni háttar
áhrif á samkeppnismarkað og efli
jafnvel samkeppnisstöðu lítilla fyrirtækja gagnvart stærri keppinautum. Þess vegna er í samkeppnislögum sk.
„minniháttarregla“ sem felur í sér að láréttir samningar (þ.e. samningar milli
fyrirtækja sem starfa á sama framleiðslu- eða sölustigi, t.d. samningar milli
smásala einungis) falla ekki undir bann við samráði fari markaðshlutdeild allra
samstarfsfyrirtækja ekki yfir 5% á neinum markaði sem máli skiptir. Þegar um
lóðrétta samninga er að ræða (þ.e. samningar milli fyrirtækja sem starfa á
mismunandi framleiðslu- eða sölustigi, t.d. samningar milli heildsala og
smásala) er miðað við að fyrirtæki með allt að 10% markaðshlutdeild geti haft
samráð án þess að brjóta samkeppnislög.
Einnig er það viðurkennt í samkeppnisrétti
að stundum geti samráð fyrirtækja haft jákvæðar afleiðingar, til að mynda ef
það stuðlar að aukinni hagræðingu, skilvirkni eða eflir tæknilegar framfarir
og/eða bætta framleiðslu á vöru. Til þess að slíkt samstarf sé heimilt þurfa
jákvæð áhrif þess að vega þyngra en þau neikvæðu. Viðkomandi samstarfsfyrirtækjum
ber í slíkum tilvikum að leggja mat á hvort samstarfið uppfylli skilyrði 1.
mgr. 15. gr. samkeppnislaga til að vera undanskilið banni samkeppnislaga við
ólögmætu samráði. Samkeppniseftirlitið
hefur gefið út Instructions which is intended to assist companies with this assessment. Also, so-called Group exemptions you mean.
Frekari upplýsingar um bann við ólögmætu
samráði má finna here.
Competition law prohibits any form of anti-competitive cooperation between two or more undertakings. Collusion between competitors is considered one of the most serious infringements of competition law, as competitors are expected to act entirely independently in the market.
Illegal collusion between companies can be both vertical, i.e. collusion between companies at different stages of the supply chain, e.g. between a wholesaler and a retailer, or horizontal, which consists of illegal cooperation between companies at the same level of trade, e.g. between two retailers. Examples of the main types of illegal collusion include:
The types of collusion listed above share the common aim of raising the prices of goods and services to the detriment of consumers. Corporate collusion can therefore have a very damaging effect on competition and worsen the terms on which the general public are offered goods and services.
The Competition Authority has made numerous decisions in which companies have been fined for participating in illegal collusion, but the Competition Authority can impose heavy fines on companies that take part in such infringements, and the fines can amount to up to 10% of the totalturnover of the relevant company or group of companies. In addition, directors of companies involved in illegal collusion may face a prison sentence of up to six years.
As is widely known, any form of anti-competitive cooperation between companies is prohibited under competition law. This is often referred to as illegal collusion between competitors. It can involve illegal collusion regarding, for example, the price of a product or service, the making of tenders when procurement or projects are put out to tender, and the division of markets between companies. Competition-restricting illegal collusion is the most serious infringement of competition law, and all collusion cases are therefore inherently important in the view of the Competition Authority.
Þrátt fyrir það eru vitaskuld sum mál mikilvægari en önnur. Sennilega má telja sk. olíumál eða olíusamráð einna mikilvægast og umfangsmest allra þeirra samráðsmála sem samkeppnisyfirvöld hér á landi hafa upplýst, sjá ákvörðun. No. 21/2004 Ólögmætt samráð Kers hf. (áður Olíufélagið hf.), Olíuverslunar Íslands hf., Skeljungs hf. og Bensínorkunnar ehf. Í því fólst m.a. samráð um verð, álagningu, gerð tilboða og markaðsskiptingu. Annað mikilvægt samráðsmál er uppræting á ólögmætu samráði fyrirtækja á grænmetismarkaði, sjá ákvörðun No. 13/2001, sem m.a. fólst í verðsamráði og markaðsskiptingu dreifingarfyrirtækja. Þá má nefna mjög alvarlegt samráð fyrirtækja á greiðslukortamarkaðnum, sjá ákvörðun No. 4/2008. Finally, reference should be made to a recent case where the companies Tæknivörur and Hátækni had an illegal agreement on the wholesale market for mobile phones, a decision No. 7/2013.
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